A multi-agent simulation model for spatial optimisation of manure allocation by Van der Straeten, Bart et al.
  
 
biblio.ugent.be 
 
The  UGent  Institutional  Repository  is  the  electronic  archiving  and  dissemination  platform  for  all 
UGent  research  publications.  Ghent  University  has  implemented  a  mandate  stipulating  that  all 
academic  publications  of UGent  researchers  should  be  deposited  and  archived  in  this  repository. 
Except  for  items  where  current  copyright  restrictions  apply,  these  papers  are  available  in  Open 
Access. 
 
This item is the archived peer‐reviewed author‐version of: 
A multi‐agent simulation model for spatial optimisation of manure allocation 
Van der Straeten, B.; Buysse, J.; Nolte, S.; Lauwers, L.; Claeys, D.; Van Huylenbroeck, G. 
In: Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 53 (8), 1011‐1030, 2010.  
 
To refer to or to cite this work, please use the citation to the published version: 
Van der Straeten, B., Buysse,  J., Nolte, S.,  Lauwers,  L., Claeys, D., Van Huylenbroeck, G. 
(2010).  A  multi‐agent  simulation  model  for  spatial  optimisation  of  manure  allocation. 
Journal  of  Environmental  Planning  and  Management  53  (8),  1011‐1030. 
10.1080/09640568.2010.495546 
 
1 
 
A multi-agent simulation model for spatial optimisation of manure 
allocation 
Van der Straeten, Bart*, Buysse, Jeroen*, Nolte, Stephan*, Lauwers, 
Ludwig
*, **
, Claeys, Dakerlia**, Van Huylenbroeck, Guido*  
 
*Department of Agricultural Economics, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium  
**Social Sciences Unit, Institute for Agricultural and Fisheries Research (ILVO), 
Merelbeke, Belgium 
 
Van der Straeten, Bart (Bart.VanderStraeten@ugent.be) (*) 
Ghent University, Department of Agricultural Economics, Coupure links 653, B-9000 
Ghent, Belgium, Tel: +32 (0) 9 264 59 28, Fax: +32 (0) 9 264 62 46 
 
Buysse, Jeroen (J.Buysse@ugent.be) & Nolte, Stephan (Stephan.Nolte@UGent.be) 
Ghent University, Department of Agricultural Economics, Coupure links 653, B-9000 
Ghent, Belgium, Tel: +32 (0) 9 264 61 80, Fax: +32 (0) 9 264 62 46 
 
Van Huylenbroeck, Guido (Guido.VanHuylenbroeck@ugent.be) 
Ghent University, Department of Agricultural Economics, Coupure links 653, B-9000 
Ghent, Belgium, Tel: +32 (0) 9 264 59 26, Fax: +32 (0) 9 264 62 46 
 
Lauwers, Ludwig (Ludwig.Lauwers@ilvo.vlaanderen.be) & 
Claeys, Dakerlia (Dakerlia.Claeys@ilvo.vlaanderen.be) 
Institute for Agricultural and Fisheries Research (ILVO), Social Sciences Unit, Burg. 
Van Gansberghelaan 115 bus 2, B-9820 Merelbeke, Belgium, 
Tel: +32(0) 9 272 23 56, Fax: +32 (0) 9 272 23 41 
 
(*) Corresponding Author: Bart Van der Straeten 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
The EU Nitrate Directive has spurred many countries to regulate manure production and 
manure application. Farmers have three allocation options: spreading manure on their 
own land, transporting manure to other farmers‟ land, or processing manure. The manure 
problem can be seen as an allocation problem. To better understand this allocation 
problem, we have developed the spatial mathematical programming multi-agent 
simulation (MP-MAS) model. This model has been applied in Flanders, Belgium, a 
region with a high livestock concentration. The model evaluates the cost efficiency of 
policy intervention in the manure market through obliged processing. We propose to 
further optimise the policy using a regionally differentiated manure pressure indicator, 
which is directly derived from the dual outcome of the mathematical program. This 
indicator increase transparency in the manure and processing market, leading to better 
decision support about location and type of manure processing.  
 
Keywords: multi-agent-simulation, mathematical programming, manure abatement, Flanders, 
spatial allocation 
 
1 Introduction 
Excess manure has become a significant problem in livestock production in many 
West-European countries in recent decades. Manure is seen as a “bad” thing (Lewis, 
2008) or as an undesirable by-product of livestock production (Huhtala and Marklund, 
2008). In countries with very concentrated animal production, e.g. the Netherlands, 
Belgium (mainly in Flanders) and parts of France and Italy, more manure is produced 
per unit of farmland than legally allowed. In Flanders, the case for this research, more 
than 260 kg of nitrogen (N) was produced per hectare of land in 1991 (Vervaet et al., 
2004). By 2006, N-production had dropped to 200 kg per hectare of land, thanks to 
policy interventions.  
This high concentration in livestock production had become possible due to 
the import of feed compounds from elsewhere in the world. The inexpensive 
availability of imported feed has favoured the growth of the livestock production in 
regions close to sea-ports (Feinerman and Komen, 2005). This dependency of 
livestock production on sea-ports has given rise to two regions with highly 
concentrated animal production in Flanders. One is located in western Flanders 
(province of West-Flanders), adjacent to the sea-port of Ghent (further served by 
tranships to the inland port of Roeselare, the centre of the livestock production area). 
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The other region is the northern part of Flanders (province of Antwerp), close to the 
sea-port of Antwerp.  
Before 1991, without any policy intervention, the nutrients in the form of 
animal manure were mostly disposed of on the farmers‟ own land. The farmers did 
not face incentives to bear the extra cost of transporting manure to other regions. They 
even benefitted from the increased crop yield, due to the very high fertilisation based 
on manure (Nesme et al., 2005). Both the excessive manure application and the 
limited nutrient uptake by crops increased the nutrient concentration in the soil. 
Nitrate and phosphate leaching from the soil polluted surface- and groundwater  
(Withers and Haygarth, 2007). 
In 1991, the European Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC)
1
 introduced the 50 mg 
nitrate per litre water standard and required the regional or national governments to 
take action against excessive application of manure and other fertilisers. This water 
quality standard led many countries to set fertilisation standards. Livestock farms 
have now three ways to allocate their produced manure: (1) using the manure on his 
own land, (2) transporting it to other (deficit) farms or (3) processing manure. The 
fertilisation standards limit use of the first and second option. As a result, the quantity 
of manure which could not be disposed of on land, must be processed.  
Manure transport is operating at maximum limits. Processing capacity, 
however, is as yet insufficient to solve the manure problem. Processing capacity must 
expand, but this is hampered by uncertainty about the evolution of the manure surplus 
and related disposal costs. Further, huge spatial differences exist in the demand for 
manure processing due to regional concentration of animal production and high 
transportation costs. The interplay between transportation and processing determines 
future demand for processing capacity. Various models exist to describe this interplay 
(De Mol and Van Beek, 1991; Lauwers, 1993; Lauwers et al., 1998). However, these 
models were mostly too aggregated (e.g., manure transport was simulated at the 
regional level) and normative and ignored insights in the actual fertilisation behaviour 
of the farmers. 
This paper presents a comprehensive manure allocation model that combines choice 
of location of processing plants with individual farmers‟ observed behaviour on 
manure production, manure disposal, manure transport and manure supply to possible 
processors. The methodology of this paper is based on Mathematical Programming-
based Multi-Agent Systems (MP-MAS), applied to a dataset containing the complete 
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farm population of Flanders (38,777 farms). This approach improves upon previous 
models and approaches by first, avoiding aggregation errors, and second, using actual 
manure application data.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, we explain the modelling aspects of 
the manure allocation problem. This includes a detailed description of all aspects of 
manure production, manure disposal, manure processing and manure transport. Next, 
we describe the dataset and present our results. We end by presenting our conclusions 
about the model and discussing the results further. Particular focus goes to a 
discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of spatial mathematical programming for 
supporting environmental and regional planning decisions, as based on the case of the 
optimal location of manure processing capacity in the manure-saturated region of 
Flanders. 
2 Modelling the manure allocation problem 
2.1 Description of the manure allocation model 
Most environmental problems such as the manure surplus involve decisions at 
different levels, namely at the farm and regional level. At the micro or farm level, the 
farmer decides to produce manure and to use, transport or process it. The aggregation 
of these numerous decisions results in a manure supply and demand at the macro or 
regional level. The decisions at the micro-level both influence and depend on the 
conditions at macro or regional level. In other words, manure supply and demand at 
the aggregated level influence and depend on micro-level decisions to either transport 
or process surplus manure. The interaction between farms, i.e., competition for 
manure disposal space, thus becomes important, as is spatial differentiation. The 
manure production and the availability of land to dispose of the manure are regionally 
diverse and create completely different conditions for micro-level decision makers 
(agents) depending on their location. In our modelling approach, agents are the model 
representatives of the real-world farmer. 
Mathematical programming models that fail to capture the interaction between 
agents are not able to simulate farmer behaviour in a heterogeneous environment 
(Berger, 2001; Boulanger and Brechet, 2005). We have thus chosen the multi-agent 
simulation (MAS) approach to model the manure allocation problem. MAS allows 
interaction between agents and can account for differences in the agents‟ 
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environment. MAS makes it possible to construct artificial micro worlds in which  
both micro- and macro-level parameters can be controlled in a spatial context 
(Courdier et al., 2002). The micro-level part of the MAS- system is represented by 
Mathematical Programming (MP), which simulates the decisions of individual agents 
while taking legal and other constraints into account. The use of MP at the core of the 
decision-making procedure captures agent heterogeneity and economic trade-offs 
while simultaneously focusing on policy-relevant constraints (Berger et al., 2006; 
Schreinemachers et al., 2007). 
Several other researchers have integrated MP in MAS, namely Berger (2001), Becu et 
al. (2003), Schreinemachers et al. (2007) and Valbuena et al. (2008). Berger (2001) 
and Becu et al. (2003) have applied MAS to the water management problem. 
Schreinemacher et al. (2007) have used a bio-economic MAS to simulate changes in 
soil fertility and poverty in Uganda. Valbuena et al.(2008) have simulated changes in 
land use with MAS. All these applications have dealt with the similar problem of 
individuals making decisions about using limited resources, where resource use by 
one decision maker affects the availability of that resource for other decision makers.  
There are differences between our research and these aforementioned  studies. 
First, their studies were all on a small scale. To the authors‟ knowledge, the MP-MAS 
approach has not yet been applied to a simulation with a large population of more 
than 38,000 individual decision makers. The successful application to this sample size 
illustrates that MP-MAS can also be used for large scale applications. Two, we make 
use of a normative approach whereas Berger (2001) and Schreinemachers et al. 
(2007) calibrated the model to a base situation (positive modelling approach)
1
. As the 
focus of the model is describing and exploring the current situation, it can be argued 
that normative modelling can be used  (Buysse et al., 2007). Three, our model focuses 
only on the manure management problem given the current situation (crop-mix, types 
of livestock, profitability, etc). Other papers (Becu et al., 2003; Berger, 2001; 
Schreinemachers et al., 2007) combine the changes in resource use with the 
possibility of adapting farm activities to economic, ecological or other conditions. Our 
model is limited in capturing the adaptive capacity of farmers to new changes in 
                                                 
1 Normative mathematical programming models  optimize an existing situation while 
positive programming models calibrate the model to an observed situation and 
subsequently simulate behavioral changes (see Buysse et al., 2007 for more details on 
the differences between both approaches)  
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policies or economic conditions. Fourth, other researchers have used specially-
developed software, but we programmed our model using standard optimisation 
software (GAMS). Berger (2001) and Schreinemachers et al.(2007) make use of MP-
MAS framework developed at Hohenheim university and Becu et al. (2003) uses the 
Cormas modelling framework (developed at CIRAD). Fifth, our model is comparative 
static, while other research depends on dynamic simulations of whole farm decisions.  
 
The structure of the model is based on the basic system description of manure 
production and allocations options (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 
 
The model focuses on farmer‟s manure allocation strategy, which is only a limited 
part of the decisions at the farm level. Therefore, manure production remains fixed in 
the model (2.2), and within the manure allocation, every possible decision is taken 
into account: disposal of manure on own land (2.3), manure processing (2.4) and 
manure transport (2.5). The final subsection describes the cost calculation of the 
objective function (2.6).  
2.2 Production of manure 
Manure production and its nutrient content is very complicated to calculate. These 
variables not only depend on the number of animals but also on the feeding 
techniques, the production process, species and the age of the animals. In a policy 
context, this complexity of nutrient production estimations is reduced by using 
generally fixed excretion standards for each type of animal
2
. Deviations from these 
excretion norms are possible when the farmer can prove that he uses feeding 
techniques that cause his animals to excrete less than average, e.g., nutrient-poor feed. 
Nutrient production is further corrected for the ammonium losses during storage.  
 
Due to lack of data, this model cannot fully account for farm specific 
differences in manure volume and quality. However, the model distinguishes the four 
major types of manure: cattle, pigs, poultry and other. Equation 1 calculates the 
manure production of farm f for manure type m (Pmf). 
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lplp
l p
mf excrnP *
 
ml  (1) 
with nlp being the number of animals of animal type l using feeding technique 
p and excrlp being the corresponding excretion standard per animal.  
2.3 Modelling the own-land manure disposal option  
A limited amount of the nutrients produced can be spread on the land according to the 
type of fertilisers, crop category
3
 and area
4
. With this disposal constraint, the manure 
decree actually created a system of tradable emission rights for manure (Lauwers et 
al., 2003). This viewpoint is justified because manure use, given the imperfect 
incorporation of nutrient inputs into end products, jointly entails a nutrient emission 
(Buysse et al., 2008). This system differs from other systems of tradable emission 
rights, as the right (the land) is linked to a fixed location and the emissions (manure) 
are tradable. For most other emission rights, the emissions cannot be traded and the 
rights are not linked to location. In reality, land entails a right to spread manure, and 
both the land and the manure itself are tradable between farms, but only the manure 
can be moved.  
The exchange of manure happens over short distances is mostly arranged as bilateral 
agreements between individual farmers. In these cases, the transport is mostly done by 
the farmers themselves. For longer distances, it are often specialised firms who 
transport manure and who also offer the service of mediator to the farmers.  
Flemish manure legislation constrains the total use of nutrients by four types 
of fertilisation standards: three for nitrogen and one for phosphorus. The first two are 
maximum norms for the use of organic nitrogen (N) and inorganic nitrogen per 
hectare. The third puts limits on the joint use of both nitrogen types per hectare. The 
fourth emission standard limits the maximum use of phosphorus (P2O5) per hectare. 
We only consider the limits on nitrogen use into because nitrogen is currently the 
most binding nutrient.  
The right to dispose manure on one‟s own land depends on the number of 
hectares and the corresponding fertilisation standards. Each combination of crop 
category and region has a fixed fertilisation standard. The general fertilisation 
standards are given in Table 1.  
Table 1 
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The farm's assigned emission rights (Rf) are implemented in the model by equation 
(2) 

a
caca
c
f hnormR *   (2) 
where hca is the number of hectares of the farm per crop category c and area a 
and normca is the fertilisation standard for crop category c in area a. The emission 
rights are calculated for the three different nitrogen fertilisation standards. Rof is the 
farm emission right for organic nitrogen, Rif is the farm emission right for inorganic 
nitrogen and Raf is the farm emission right for total nitrogen. 
Equation (2) is expressed as if the available manure disposal space can and 
will always be precisely used. In reality, emission rights, quota or other constraints are 
often not exactly binding because of uncertainty about production and the availability 
of rights, and differences in risk behaviour of farms (Buysse et al., 2008). As it is 
important to use the actual farmer‟s fertilising behaviour in simulations, the available 
emission rights are set equal to the current use of these rights. Two different 
approaches are used for the cases of over-fertilisation and under-fertilisation.  
In 2006, many farms disposed more nutrients on their land than legally 
allowed by their  assigned emission rights because they did not succeed in processing 
the manure or in exchanging the manure with another farm. Despite the penalties 
introduced by the manure decree, this over-fertilisation persists because of insufficient 
manure processing capacity. For the case of over-fertilisation the available emission 
rights are set equal to the assigned emission rights.  
Other farms do not completely use their available quota for organic manure 
despite the fact the surplus farms are willing to pay to manure deficit farms, in some 
regions more than 300 euro per ha for manure disposal. One of the reasons for not 
completely using the organic manure quota is that some farmers prefer inorganic to 
organic fertiliser for certain crops (Feinerman and Komen, 2005; Van der Straeten et 
al., 2008). Because we assume that farmers will continue this behaviour and thus use 
less organic manure than legally allowed, the calibration in the current case sets the 
available emission rights in the model equal to the current use of the rights. Based on 
the calibrated emission rights, equations 3-5 describe the legal part of disposing 
manure on own land.  
 
m
ofmf RU
     (3) 
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ifif RU       (4) 
 
m
afifmf RUU
    (5) 
 
where Umf  is the quantity of manure disposed on the land and Uif the quantity 
of chemical fertilisers used on land. The use of both types of nitrogen is limited to the 
respective individual emission right and the joint emission right. In the model, the 
farmer can only optimise his fertilisation behaviour by changing the organic manure 
allocation. Because of the fixed chemical nitrogen use, only equations (3) and (5) are 
relevant. As long as the chemical fertiliser use is low enough, equation (3) is the 
binding constraint. With higher chemical fertiliser doses, the allocation of organic 
nitrogen will be limited by equation (5) (Van der Straeten et al., 2008). 
2.4 Modelling the manure processing 
A second manure allocation option is to process the manure. Manure processing or 
manure treatment has been defined as a comprehensive term for all technologies 
which remove or recover nutrients out of manure (Flotats et al., 2008) or making 
manure products that can compete with chemical fertilisers (Melse and Timmerman, 
2008). The end products can be used on farmland, home or public gardens, etc. 
(Melse et al., 2004). The most important technique used in Flanders is a biological 
nitrification/denitrification system (used in more than 25% of the total processing 
installations) (VCM, 2007). This technique converts nitrogen into dinitrogen gas (N2) 
(Melse and Verdoes, 2005). 
 
Manure processing can be imposed by law (legally obliged processing) or can be the 
choice of the farmer depending on the market situation (market driven processing). 
Obligatory processing is directly imposed by the manure regulation because the 
policy does not give the farm the option to compete for on-land disposal. Each farm 
with a production of more than 10,000 kg phosphorus and all farms in a municipality 
with a production of 100 P2O5/ha and a production of more than 7,500 kg phosphorus, 
are obliged to process a given share of the farm manure surplus. This share depends 
on the total phosphorus production at the farm. For each farm, the quantity of nitrogen 
it is obliged to process is known. In the model, obligatory processing is imposed by 
putting an extra constraint (6): 
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  obligedmf PRPR      (6) 
where PRmf  is the processed amount of manure and PRobliged the obligatory 
amount of manure processing. 
Farms must process manure as well when they produce manure but are unable to 
dispose of it within the legal limits on their own land or exchange it with other farms. 
This market-driven processing is not directly imposed by law but is rather a 
consequence of the manure disposal limits on land.  
The introduction of processing as an alternative to disposal on agricultural 
land creates a balancing problem in the manure allocation model. Equation (7) 
imposes that the allocation problem stays balanced during the simulation procedure. 
The disposal of manure of type m (Umf ) is equal to the sum of the production of the 
manure at the farm (Pmf ) plus the incoming manure (Imf ) minus the outgoing manure 
(Emf ) minus the processed amount of manure (PRmf ). The balance between the two 
variables that depend on the interaction between other farms is described in the next 
section.  
mfmfmfmfmf PREIPU      (7) 
 
Manure processing can be conducted in small-scale farm-based installations and in 
specialised processing firms. However, the model does not distinguish between these, 
because further simulations only use the total processing capacity in each 
municipality. 
2.5 Modelling the manure transport 
All previous policy-driven constraints can be simulated at individual farm level 
without considering interactions between the farms. However, interactions between 
farms must be simulated when modelling manure transport. Modelling the manure 
market differs from other quota markets such as the dairy quota, sugar quota or CO2-
emission rights.  
The main difference with the aforementioned quota markets is that, for the 
manure problem, emissions are tradable and the rights are locally fixed, while in 
contrast, for the CO2-emission rights and most other quota markets, emissions are not 
tradable while the rights are. Manure emissions themselves are tradable, thus manure 
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transport costs become important, as they create a spatial difference in willingness to 
pay and influence the market price for manure disposal.  
Despite the reality of strong rigidities and transaction costs in quota markets, 
their modelling is often based on a perfect market for quota rights (Alvarez et al., 
2006; Brannlund et al., 1998; Bureau et al., 1997; Fraser et al., 1997; Mahler, 1994; 
Van Passel et al., 2006).  
The simulation of each farm in the population and their interactions removes 
all possible sampling errors. However, it complicates the computation of finding 
optimal solutions in a large population, as the computer capacity required becomes 
very large. Our dataset of 38,777 farms and four types of manure would, for instance, 
result in a transport matrix of 6,014,622,916 cells. We resolved this by introducing a 
hypothetical transport firm for each municipality. The transport firm acts as an 
assembly point where each farm of the respective municipality can offer its excess or 
collect its demand of manure.  
Working with municipal transport firms lowers the number of cells  in the 
transport matrix but does not violate the optimisation at farm level. The individual 
farm still decides whether transport of manure is desirable or not. Once these optimal 
levels are determined at farm level, the optimisation of the exchange of manure 
between the different municipalities occurs at transport firm level. The transport firm 
itself is only a tool for allowing optimal exchange over the whole Flemish region and 
results have proven that the outcome is identical to a simulation where all farms 
interact directly with each other while the transport matrix contains only 1232*1232 
cells. Theoretically both should be equal since the transportation costs between farms 
are identical to those between the municipalities they are located in and the 
constraints of demand and supply of manure on municipality level are added up out of 
these farms. 
 
Figure 2 
Figure 2 shows the example for the transport firm of municipality 1. This 
municipality has n farms. Instead of allowing interaction between these n farms with 
the whole population, only interaction with the municipal transport firm is taken into 
account. The interactions with farms of other municipalities are lifted to the higher 
level where only the interactions between the municipality transport firms are 
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simulated. The model optimises both the transports within the municipality and the 
transports between the municipalities.  
The transport behaviour of the farms is integrated into the equations (8) to (10). 
mfmft PE      (8) 
 
f
mfttmt
t
ET
121
2
   (9) 
 
f
mfttmt
t
IT
221
1
   (10) 
with Emft being the amount of exported manure of manure type m from the 
farm to transport firm t, Imft the amount of incoming manure of manure type m at the 
farm from transport firm t and Tmt1t2 the amount of manure of manure type m 
transported from transport firm t1 to transport firm t2. Constraint (8) prevents the 
amount of exported manure from exceeding the produced manure of each manure 
type. Equation (9) imposes that all the exported manure of the individual farms to 
their respective transport firms is also exported out of these firms to other transport 
firms (or the transport firm itself). Equation (10) does the same but on the incoming 
side. It imposes that the transport firm distributes its total received amount of manure 
to the respective individual farms.  
The equations (9) and (10) introduce the manure market in the model because they 
link the manure transports of all farms to each other. The supply and demand of 
manure is balanced when a market equilibrium is reached. The two equations are 
defined at the level of a municipality resulting in equal transport shadow prices for all 
farms in a municipality. The differences in shadow prices between municipalities are 
driven by the transport costs. This type of simulation behaviour of markets is similar 
to a Spatial Price Equilibrium Model (Takayama and Judge, 1971).  
2.6 Cost calculation 
The final step in the model description is defining the objective function. According 
to Aubry et al. (2006) manure management in the Reunion Island (France) is not fully 
controlled and planned as is the case with other farm activities. Manure management 
choices depend on time rather than on economic or ecological principals. The author 
argues that similar behaviour in other locations can be found. However, in Flanders, 
because of the strict legal prescriptions, this is not the case. Local experts believe that 
manure management takes a leading place in farm management. In the region with the 
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highest cost for manure allocation, the allocation costs run up to 2 euro per kg 
nitrogen, resulting into a cost of 19 euro per finishing pig place. This is more than 8% 
of the total turnover and almost 30% of gross margin (based on average Flemish 
FADN data of 1989-2003). Therefore it is very unlikely that economic principles do 
not play a role. Moreover, in practice it is seen that livestock farmers do minimise 
their costs. The model thus assumes cost minimising behaviour.   
 
As we have limit the use of manure to the actual use of manure in 2006, we fixed the 
possible profits from manure use. The farmer remains free to choose among the three 
aforementioned allocation options. All three options involve costs (Table 2).  
Table 2 
Expressed to the volume, the costs are all assumed equal for each manure 
type. There is, however, a large difference in nitrogen content between the four types 
of manure. As the model is driven by the nutrient rights, the costs per kg of nutrient 
need to be taken into account (Table 3). 
Table 3 
The allocation results result from the differences in costs between the three 
allocation options and the differences in nitrogen content between the four types of 
manure. The distribution option (i.e., disposing the manure on own farm's land) is the 
least expensive option. When all the available emission rights are used, the farmer 
will search for available emission rights on other farms. The final option is to process 
the manure. Manure from poultry has the highest nitrogen content, followed by pig 
manure. Consequently, transport costs and processing costs expressed per kg N will 
be the lowest for poultry. As a result the farmer will choose to process manure in the 
following order of manure type: poultry, pigs, other and cattle.  
Equations (11) to (13) calculate the costs of the different manure allocation 
options. 
mummf
m
uf contentNtUC _/cos*
   (11) 
mPRmmf
m
PRf contentNtPRC _/cos*
  (12) 
mttemtmt
mt
t contentNcedistTC _/tan*cos* 2121
2
1 
 (13) 
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with costum being the costs to dispose of 1 m³ manure of type m on the 
farmer‟s own land, costPRm the costs to process 1 m³ manure of type m, costem the 
costs to transport 1 m³ manure of type m over 1 km, distancet1t2 is the distance 
between farm t1 en farm t2 and N_contentm the N content per m³ of manure of type m. 
Cuf and CPRf are the total disposal and processing costs of the farm, respectively, while 
Ct is the total cost of the transport firm t.  
 The final phase in constructing the model is to define the objective function 
(equation 14). 
 
f t
tPRfuf
EVU
CCCtsMin
mfmfmf
)(cos
,,
   (14) 
3 Data 
The Flemish Land Agency (FLA)‟s database was used for our model. It contains all 
variables related to manure production, transactions, acquisitions and use of nutrients,  
for each Flemish farm. The total dataset consists of 60,577 farms over a period of 
seven years (2000-2006) with a total of 311,430 unbalanced panel observations. The 
current paper only takes farms with more than 2 hectares or a nutrient production of 
more than 300 kg phosphorus in the year 2006 into account. The sample used consists 
of 38,777 farms. Table 4 shows the aggregated figures of the total emission rights and 
the nutrient excretion in the sample.  
Table 4 
In 2006, 102 million emission rights for organic nitrogen (kg N) were used in 
practice, a total of 72.5% of the available emission rights for organic nitrogen. In 
practice, Flanders is not able to dispose about 26.4 million kg out of the 102 million 
kg of nitrogen produced on the available farmland. As only 16.3 million kg is 
processed, an over-fertilisation of 10.1 million kg nitrogen remains.  
4 Model results 
The proposed model and the dataset can be used for different applications in manure 
management choices, policy evaluations and investment decision support analysis.  
All results focus on macro (regional) impact but they are driven by the decisions at 
the micro (farm) level. First, the model can be used to evaluate policy alternatives and 
their impact on costs of manure allocation. Second, the model supports investment 
decisions by advising on location and type of manure processing. The simulations 
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compare the existing manure processing capacity with the optimal demand. The 
model results indicate whether the manure processing capacity developed so far is 
efficiently located. Taking the already existing capacity into account, new simulations 
show where more investments in processing capacity are needed. Finally, the model 
produces results for an indicator that creates transparency in the manure transport and 
processing market.   
To validate the model results with actual figures the Pearson‟s correlation coefficient 
(r) is used (Nolte, 2008). The coefficient for net transport flows between 
municipalities (R: 0.809; P:0.000) and the process behaviour (R: 0.786, P: 0.000) are 
rather high. This indicates that our model is capable of reproducing actual farmers‟ 
behaviour rather well. 
 
4.1 Policy analysis 
First, the model is applied for straightforward calculations of the impact of policy 
choices on sector parameters. The effect of the legally obliged manure processing on 
the total manure allocation costs is taken here as an example. The manure policy tries 
to cool down the manure market by imposing a processing obligation on the farms 
with the largest manure surplus. Moreover, this enables policymakers to steer the 
development of manure processing. The model is used to investigate the cost-
effectiveness of the attempt. The total cost for manure allocation with the obliged 
manure processing is compared to the situation where only market-driven processing 
is simulated (Table 5 and Table 6). 
 
Table 5 & Table 6 
In the case of market-driven processing, the individual decision makers in the 
model will optimise the location and the type of manure processing to meet the 
nitrogen fertilisation restrictions. This increased freedom for the individual decision 
makers lowers the total cost of manure allocation by 2,399,330 euro while keeping the 
amount of nitrogen used on the land according to the fertilisation standards. The 
model shows that the policy indicator for steering manure processing is not very 
efficient.  
More than 20% of the nitrogen from manure has to be processed, which also 
creates a high cost for the farms with a manure surplus. Therefore, it is important to 
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search for the most cost-efficient policy and investments for optimal manure 
allocation. We show here how the policy could be improved, while the following 
subsection shows how the use of MP-MAS as a planning instrument can help 
investors to obtain more benefits from manure processing by the development of the 
best type of plant on the optimal location.  
4.2 Investment decision support analysis 
In 2006, the total demand for manure processing was 26.40 million kg nitrogen (Table 
5: sum of simulated obligatory and market-driven processed N) while only 16.3 
million kg nitrogen was effectively processed. This gap implies that there is an extra 
demand for manure processing of 10.1 million kg nitrogen. The model enables 
investors to determine where extra processing capacity is most desirable according to 
the stated objective.  
The lowest possible costs for the farmer (cost-efficient) and the highest benefit 
from the manure processor is reached by optimising the location of the processing 
systems and the type of manure that can be processed. Building capacity close to the 
farms demanding extra processing capacity lowers the transport distance to the 
processing system. The choice of type of manure is also very important because 
processing costs differ significantly among manure types.  
The results of model simulations of the optimal manure processing locations 
given the current policy are shown in Figure 3, including the municipal manure 
surplus
5
 and thus the processing demand. In total, 26.40 million kg must be processed 
in Flanders including both legally obliged and market-driven manure processing. The 
location of the obliged processing is driven by the policy criteria and is spread quite 
evenly in Flanders. The market-driven processing is only driven by the maximum 
fertilisation limits on the land, production and economic motivations for minimising 
transport and processing costs.  
Figure 3 
Figure 3 gives only a purely normative outcome of where the optimal location 
of processing capacity should be planned. For the implementation of extra processing 
capacity, it is important to know where the current operational processing capacity is 
located. This is illustrated in Figure 4. As already indicated, the current operational 
processing capacity is almost 16.4 million kg N in Flanders. 
Figure 4 
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Given the current situation, the new optimal location pattern must be updated. 
The operational capacity now available (Figure 4) is introduced in the model and a 
new simulation procedure is performed. Figure 5 illustrates the result of the second 
simulation: the most cost-effective investment would be a pig manure processing 
plant in the centre of West-Flanders.  
Figure 5 
4.3 Regional manure pressure indicator 
The legally-imposed processing has allocation costs of + 2%. This is far from optimal, 
and is caused by the criteria on which obligatory manure processing is based. The 
current policy, i.e., steering the obligatory manure processing, uses an indicator that is 
based on a simple comparison of animal production and the number of hectares. This 
indicator is not very precise because it ignores the possibility of transport to 
neighbouring regions and disregards the fertilisation behaviour of the farms. 
The needed processing capacity (Figure 5) is already a much better indicator 
because it takes transport, type of manure and actual fertilising behaviour into 
account. However, Figure 5 does not tell the decision maker how much the 
investment in processing capacity may cost and how much an individual farm may 
pay for manure disposal on land. Therefore, the decision maker needs an economic 
estimate linked to the disposal constraint. This can be found in the dual outcome of 
the mathematical programme. 
A regional manure pressure indicator (RMPI) is defined from the dual value of 
the manure allocation equation (3) of the MP-MAS manure allocation model 
presented in this paper. This dual value gives the marginal cost of disposing 1 kg 
nitrogen, or the shadow price of the disposal constraint. For simplicity, we opted for 
one RPMI per municipality. This aggregates the farms within a municipality into a 
single farm. The model is then run for the remaining 308 farms (equal to the 308 
existing municipalities in Flanders). In regions with highly concentrated animal 
production and a relatively low number of emission rights nearby, this cost (dual 
value or regional manure pressure) is high. When competition for free emission rights 
is rather low, the regional manure pressure will also be low. Figure 6 gives the 
regional manure pressure.  
Figure 6 
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The RMPI is expressed in monetary terms, which makes it very relevant 
additional information for policy makers and manure processing investors. The RPMI 
shows the spatial distribution of the willingness to pay for manure processing. While 
Figure 5 indicates the quantity of the manure processing demand , the RMPI also 
indicates the regional impact of the demand in monetary terms. This may lead 
investors to develop a larger capacity in a certain municipality than needed with the 
aim of serving neighbouring municipalities with a high RPMI.  
The RPMI can therefore also provide market information on transport of 
manure between farms. Better market information can make the transport market 
more transparent because it clearly shows the maximum cost of disposing manure in 
each region.  
5 Discussion 
Nitrate pollution is a typical example of emission where the spatial aspect is 
important, in particular because of emissions in water or soil often disperse slowly. As 
a consequence, emission thresholds to soil and water need to be expressed as amount 
of pollution per area, or per volume of water or soil, and per time. This also means 
that the standards of the European Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC)1, which has also 
been enacted in Flanders, can be seen as emission rights that are tradable but bound in 
space and time. Current paper focuses mainly on the spatial aspect. To make 
abstraction of the time component, which is theoretically important, the time unit of 
one simulation run in the presented model equals one year. Within-year time factors, 
such as the period of emission of manure within the year, and its environmental 
impact are out of the scope of the present article. 
The MP-MAS methodology presented here has three important strengths. First, the 
model can simulate the interplay between micro (farm) and macro (regional) level. 
Second, the spatial pattern of emission and emissions rights can be taken into account. 
Third, the heterogeneity between firms and emission abatement technology can be 
simulated. Compared to existing MP-MAS applications, the current paper has the 
advantage of working with the entire population, which eliminates all possible 
sampling errors. The application illustrates that with modern IT software and 
hardware MP-MAS applications can be developed for national or international 
samples of agents.  
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One disadvantage of the present model is that it focuses on only one part of the 
decision making process of the agents (manure management) and ignores possible 
interactions with other management decisions at farm level, such as crop choice. 
Further research efforts will focus on building in this feature into the model. Another 
disadvantage compared to other MP-MAS applications is that the current application 
is normative, while other models such as the one used by Berger (2001) and 
Schreinemachers et al. (2007) are positive, although this is justified given the research 
questions. A future line of study could be to create a positive version of the model for 
other applications (e.g., to model farmers‟ reactions in case of policy changes).  
The method in this paper introduces and quantifies the spatial economic impact of the 
emission rights policy, and goes beyond traditional manure allocation simulation, 
because it also takes agents‟ behaviour (farmers and processing investors) into 
account. As such, the model has a decision support value for both policy makers and 
private actors. Towards the private actors, optimal processing capacity and location in 
accordance to the transportation flows is at stake. Because the large spatial differences 
in manure production and manure disposal space and individual behaviour, the model 
provides the necessary insights for the transportation-processing choice problem. The 
results show that the demand for extra manure processing capacity is heterogeneously 
spread over the whole Flemish regions, confirming that it would be hard to define 
those places in advance without having a total view on the market. The same can be 
said about the regional manure pressure indicator which uses available information in 
an integrative way to indicate the economic cost of allocating one extra kg of nitrogen 
in a given location. These integrative understandings help to make better decisions in 
the future, both at private (farmers and processing investors) and policy level. It may 
avoid that processing capacity is built in regions where there may be a lack of „cheap‟ 
manure. 
Mandatory manure processing is used as a case for policy analysis. Mandatory 
manure processing can be seen as a policy intervention in a quota market. The results 
show that the total cost of such policy amounts to 2.4 million euro compared with the 
present situation without a processing obligation. This is in accordance with other 
studies: additional interventions in an existing quota system increase the costs for 
private actors in the system without enhancing the effectiveness of the quota system 
(Tietenberg, 2003; Van der Straeten et al., 2009). A comparable study (Helming and 
Reinhard, 2009) in the Netherlands, also a country with huge nutrient emissions, 
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quantified the costs of different measures to reduce nitrate leaching. Their model 
simulates, next to the manure transport, also production decisions for the livestock 
and crop activities. From modeling perspective, Helming and Reinhard (2009) 
confirm the assumption in the current paper that transport and processing (they call 
this export) are the main options to deal with manure surplus. The more aggregated 
approach of Helming and Reinhard (2009), however,  underestimates the transport 
costs compared with the firm level approach as applied in this paper.  
Despite this similarity, the results of the policy simulations of Helming and Reinhard 
(2009) are not comparable because of the differences in cases and the focus of the 
cost calculation. Helming and Reinhard (2009) found a total cost of €81.5 million per 
year for the additional measures of the water framework directive while our paper 
focused on more specific policy interventions such as a manure processing obligation. 
 
6 Conclusions 
The model presented in this paper simulates spatially heterogeneous environmental 
pollution and is applied to the case of manure surplus in Flanders. In this way, the 
possibilities of a MP-MAS based model as decision support tool for policymakers and 
for private investors is illustrated. The model results for the concrete case have shown 
that the current manure processing capacity is already located close to regions where 
the emission abatement is the most profitable, but also that further investments in 
manure processing capacity remain necessary.  
The model has two types of results that are interesting for decision makers. First, the 
model can compare different policy alternatives and calculate the differences in costs 
for the farmers. As an example, we have shown here that the current manure 
processing obligation introduces an extra cost of almost 2.4 million euro that could be 
saved if a more market-based approach was used. Second, the model provides a 
spatial indicator of the intensity of the economic consequences of the policy. The 
newly proposed measure is based on location-specific marginal costs of pollution 
abatement, and improves the current policy indicator which is only based on a simple 
ration of manure production and area. The new measure benefits both the policymaker 
and the farmer. The regional manure pressure indicator in our model measures the 
impact of the policy more precisely, because it takes regional interactions into 
account. A better policy indicator also allows the policymaker to better target the 
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policy in question. The regional manure pressure indicator is also relevant for farmers 
because it increases market transparency.  
Given the method‟s strengths and despite some disadvantages discussed in previous 
section, the proposed way of analyzing tradable emissions rights fixed in time and 
space has many other possible applications. Environmental management of 
undesirable outputs, such as heavy metal emission, soil pollution, or noise pollution, 
has the similar property of being expressed as acceptable threshold per unit of space 
and time. The management of spatially limited resources such as water is also similar. 
Berger (2001) and Becu et al. (2003) have already applied a MP-MAS model on the 
water management for a small basin. It shows that further development of this kind of 
models gives clear perspectives certainly when the availability of stronger calculation 
capacities make also application on larger cases possible. 
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1
The main purpose of the directive was to protect the waters against pollution caused by nitrates from 
agricultural sources 
2
Animal type: combination of species and age 
3
The manure regulation has subdivided crops into four different categories (grassland, maize, low 
nitrogen crops and other crops) 
4
In the manure regulations distinction is made between general areas and several vulnerable areas ( e.g. 
water, nature, phosphorus saturated areas) 
5
Surplus manure : manure which can not be disposed on own land or transported to other farms 
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Table 1. Fertilisation standards in kg N /ha (*) (period 1/1/2003 until 31/12/2006) 
(Vlaamse regering, 2006) 
Crop category P2O5 Total N Organic N Inorganic N 
Grassland 130 500 250 350 
Maize 100 275 250 150 
Low N crops (**) 100 125 125 100 
Other crops (***) 110 275 200 200 
* Only the fertilization norms for the general areas are given. More stringent norms are imposed 
for vulnerable areas  
**Crops with a low N demand, e.g. onions, chicory, clovers, fruit plantations, flowers,… 
***All crops not belonging to one of the 3 other categories, e.g. potatoes, sugar beets, cereals, 
legumes, … 
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Table 2. The costs for each allocation option (VCM STIM, 2004) 
Allocation options Used value 
Distribution costs (€/m³) 2.5 
Transport costs (€/km/m³) 0.18 
Processing costs (€/m³) 22.5 
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Table 3.  Average nitrogen content per m³ (kg N/ m³) 
Manure type Used value (*) 
Cattle 4.95 
Pigs 6.91 
Poultry 15.89 
Other  4.14 
* within the 4 types of manure the N-content varies among the different animal types. Therefore, 
the used value is the weighted average N-content of all produced manure in Flanders (source: 
own calculations) 
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Table 4. Aggregated figures regarding the production and use of organic nitrogen in 
Flanders in 2006 (source: own calculations) 
variable Value  
Total used emission right for organic nitrogen (million kg N) 102.09 
Actual production of organic nitrogen (million kg N) 128.50  
Production surplus of organic nitrogen (million kg N) 26.40  
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Table 5. the simulated allocation choices compared between market driven manure 
processing and legally obliged processing (in million kg) 
 cattle pig poultry other 
Nitrogen production 67.69 45.66 12.71 2,44 
Market driven processing option     
Simulated total disposed N 67.70 31.31 0.66 2.44 
Simulated transported N 10.53 26.34 1.05 0.32 
Simulated (market driven) 
processed N 
0 14.35 12.05 0 
Legally obliged processing option    
Simulated total disposed N 67.16 31.31 1.19 2.43 
Simulated transported N 7.48 18.99 1.16 0.58 
Obligatory processed N 0.53 7.14 4.93 0.007 
Simulated (market driven) 
processed N 
0 7.21 6.59  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
Table 6. total costs per allocation option compared between market driven manure 
processing and legally obliged processing (million euro) 
 No legally obliged processing Legally obliged processing 
Disposal costs 47.09 46.90 
Transport costs 8.97 9.87 
Processing costs 63.80 65.48 
Total costs 119.86 122.26 
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